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also indicates the absence of a fixed standard for appellate review of
state law questions." Until the Supreme Court resolves the conflict
among the circuits,97 this issue deserves express recognition and reso-




The past year has been a productive one for the Fourth Circuit in
the area of civil rights litigation. The court has handed down a num-
ber of significant decisions involving discriminatory conduct by both
private individuals and public officials. Cases dealing with private
discrimination' have addressed the constitutionality under the 1866
Civil Rights Act2 of a private school's discriminatory admission poli-
cies;3 the applicability of the due diligence defense to directors of a
private corporation previously found guilty of unlawful racial dis-
crimination;' and the protection afforded by federal law to an em-
ployee discharged because he belonged to an organization objectiona-
ble to his private employer.5
96 See also, e.g., cases cited in note 7 supra.
,7 See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
The term "private discrimination" refers to the discriminatory and independent
conduct of private citizens. Such conduct has only recently been considered actionable
under federal civil rights laws. See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimi-
nation: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1974); Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups:
The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom From Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441
(1975).
Public discrimination, on the other hand, involves conduct by government offi-
cials, or state action, and has traditionally been considered within the reach of federal
law. For a discussion of various concepts of state action, see Note, State Action:
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 656 (1974).
2 Presently, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
3 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3271
(U.S. November 11, 1975) (No. 75-306), aff'g in part and rev'g in part Gonzales v.
Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973). See text accompany-
ing notes 6-45 infra.
I Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975). See
text accompanying notes 46-68 infra.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
In McCrary v. Runyon,' the Fourth Circuit considered for the first
time whether the discriminatory admission policies of a private
school violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981.7 At the district court level,8 the
plaintiffs successfully proved that the defendant schools had denied
their children admission on the basis of race. The Court of Appeals
had little difficulty affirming this determination on the facts Never-
theless, the court still faced the issues of whether § 1981 applied to
private discrimination, and whether the defendants' activities were
constitutionally protected exercises of the rights to free association
and privacy.
In holding that § 1981 proscribed discrimination by private par-
ties, the Fourth Circuit recognized the common derivation of § 1981
and § 1982' 0 from the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866."
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.'2 that § 1982 reached private discrimination,'3 the Fourth Circuit
I Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). See text accompa-
nying notes 69-92 infra.
6 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. November 11,
1975) (No. 75-306).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.
Id.
, Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
1 Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales were told that the Fairfax-Brewster School was not
integrated when they sought to learn why their son's application to the first grade had
been rejected. Both the Gonzales' and Mrs. McCrary were informed by an official at
the Bobbe's School that the school accepted only white children and as a result, they
did not make formal application there. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363
F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1973).
,0 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
Id.
i These sections originated in the Act of April 9, 1866, c.31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-
enacted by Act of May 31, 1870, c.114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, and were codified in §
1977 and § 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874.
' 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
,3 In Jones, a developer had refused to sell real estate to a black in an exclusively
white area. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), which protects the right to purchase property, was
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reasoned that § 1981 should be accorded a similar interpretation.
This conclusion was supported by two other Supreme Court deci-
sions, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 4 and Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association,5 which extended the § 1982
prohibition to private discrimination in swimming pool facilities." In
all three cases, the Supreme Court held that § 1982, which protects
the right to purchase property, was a valid exercise of congressional
power under the thirteenth amendment enforcement clause to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing the badges and incidents
of slavery. The Court further held that the thirteenth amendment
reached private conduct in which no state action was involved.
held applicable to purely private activity as a valid exercise of congressional power
under the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,
§ 2. That clause provides for the enactment of all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing the badges and incidents of slavery. In Jones, private racial discrimination
in the sale or rental of property was designated a relic of slavery, and § 1982 was found
to be rationally related to the goal of eliminating this vestige. 392 U.S. at 439-43.
1, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
410 U.S. 431 (1973).
16 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court applied § 1982 to the discriminatory refusal of
a private recreational facility, organized to serve the owners and lessees of residential
property in a certain area, to allow a white member's transfer of his otherwise assigna-
ble membership share in Little Hunting Park to a black lessee. The Court held that
the assignment of the membership share was incidental to the leasehold interest in the
Park which the tenant had purchased from the white lessor. Consequently, the Court
granted the tenant damages to compensate him for the Park's deprivation of his "same
right" to lease property under § 1982. The Park was held liable because the transaction
clearly fell within the lease, and the right to lease was protected by § 1982 against the
actions of third parties as well as against the actions of the immediate lessor. Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969).
The Supreme Court further extended the'concept that rights incidental to prop-
erty ownership were property interests protected by § 1982 in Tilman, which involved
a geographic preference for residents of a given area in a community swimming pool
association. The plaintiffs were a black couple who had bought a home in the area from
a non-member, but were discouraged from seeking membership in the association
because of their race. The district court rendered summary judgment for Wheaton-
Haven on the ground that geographical preferences were non-negotiable, unlike the
membership shares in Sullivan, and were too speculative an interest to support the
conclusion that there was a transfer of membership incident to the purchase of prop-
erty. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971). The
Supreme Court held that when an organization linked membership benefits to resi-
dency in a narrow geographic area, that decision infused those benefits into the rights
for which one paid when he bought or leased within the area. Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973). Thus, Wheaton-Haven's racially
discriminatory refusal to grant plaintiffs the standard geographical preferences worked
to deprive them of the "same right" to buy property in the area that whites enjoyed.
Id.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Analogizing these cases to McCrary, the Fourth Circuit found that
the rejections of the black applicants were based solely on racial
grounds. 7 The court determined that such conduct could be consid-
ered a badge or incident of slavery actionable under § 1981 as a valid
means of enforcing the thirteenth amendment. Further support for
this reasoning seems to exist in Jones, in which the prohibition of
private discrimination stemmed from the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the term "same right" in § 1982.' s Although the same term
is found in § 1981,'1 the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether §
1981 and § 1982 should be treated similarly."
The McCrary court further noted that the relationship between a
school and a pupil and his parents was a contractual one within the
meaning of § 1981.1 Although § 1981 deals with the right to con-
"7 515 F.2d at 1086. Further support for this conclusion may be found in the Jones
Court's overruling of Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). In Hodges, the Court
held that the predecessor of § 1981 did not reach private interference with contractual
rights, specifically, efforts by white terrorists to prevent blacks from working in a
sawmill, because the law applied only to slavery. Id. at 16-17. The Jones Court explic-
itly repudiated this position and thus suggested that § 1981 may be applied to private,
racially-motivated interference with contractual opportunities. 392 U.S. at 441-43
n.78.
" See note 16 supra. For text of § 1982 see note 10 supra.
" See note 7 supra.
20 Although the Supreme Court has not yet held that § 1981 and § 1982 are to be
treated similarly, every circuit court which has addressed the issue of the application
of § 1981 to private discrimination has chosen so to extend the Jones reasoning, most
notably in cases involving employment relationsliips. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d
500 (6th Cir. 1974); Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 156 U.S. App.
D.C. 69, 478 F.2d 979, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
468 F.2d 1201, 1204 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Brady. v.
Bristol-Myers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing
Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1379 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Linscott
v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 18 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971);
Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders
v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 482-83 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
But see Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd on other
grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972), which expressly rejected the application of §
1981 to a non-employment contractual relationship. The district court held that § 1981
contained a "state action" limitation, but the Fifth Circuit has rejected such a limita-
tion in other employment cases. E.g., Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
22 The court added that admission was part of the process of forming such contrac-
tual arrangement. 515 F.2d at 1087.
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tract,' the court's characterization is novel because the statute has
generally been applied only to employment contracts.? Courts have
applied the statute in other situations" but seldom to the school-
pupil relationship." One commentator has argued, however, that pri-
vate schools may be considered public accommodations which pro-
vide educational services to consumers in return for a fee.2" It seems
plausible to consider such a school as a business open to the general
public because the tuition fee is often the only significant restriction
on the public's access to its educational services. Tuition fees may
then be characterized as consideration for the performance of these
services in accordance with contract law, and solicitations could con-
stitute offers. Whenever an offer would be accepted but for a racially
motivated refusal to deal, § 1981 could be held to apply.
The second major issue in McCrary involved the parties' rights to
free association and privacy. The Fourth Circuit held that no party
had been deprived of these rights. It considered the right of free
association to be an outgrowth of the first amendment right to free-
dom of speech28 and determined that the right would not justify ex-
clusionary policies based on race. 9 The extent to which associational
freedom supports private discrimination is unclear because of the
dearth of cases in which the right was directly in issue."0 Yet, appar-
2 See note 7 supra.
2 See note 20 supra.
24 E.g., Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970)
(purchase of a ticket to an amusement park); United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F.
Supp. 145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969) (admission of patients to a private hospital).
2 In Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973),
the court indicated a willingness to apply § 1981 to a private school but did not do so
because the exclusion of the black applicant was based on nonracial considerations.
In Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971), the district court
held that § 1981 prohibited a refusal to admit blacks to a private barber school.
2 See Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus
Freedom From Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1444 n.15 (1975).
1 The conclusion that the schools held themselves out as open to the public is
supported by the fact that they advertised in the "Yellow Pages" of the telephone
directory and sent a mass mailing addressed to "Resident." 515 F.2d at 1084.
11 515 F.2d at 1087. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court
stated that it was beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas was an inseparable aspect of the liberty guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment due process clause which embraced the first amendment free-
dom of speech. It also noted that it was immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be
advanced by association pertained to political, economic, religious or cultural matters.
Id. at 460.
515 F.2d at 1087.
The Supreme Court in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), noted that
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ently, no case has ever flatly stated that freedom of association sup-
ported a right to discriminate racially,3 and the Fourth Circuit could
find no compelling reason to break with precedent.
The McCrary court similarly concluded that the right of privacy
offered no support for a constitutional right to discriminate.32 This
conclusion is not in conflict with any prior holding of the Supreme
Court dealing with privacy. So far, the Supreme Court has found a
right of privacy only in relationships involving some degree of inti-
macy." However, in Roe v. Wade34 the Supreme Court noted that the
private discrimination by schools receiving state aid was not barred by the Constitu-
tion, nor did such discrimination invoke any legal sanction. Id. at 469. The Court later
noted, however, that although invidious private discrimination could be characterized
as an exercise of freedom of association protected by the first amendment, such con-
duct had never been accorded affirmative constitutional protection. Id. at 470. Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that the question of whether segregation in private schools
was constitutionally protected was not being decided. Id. at 457.
In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), the city's grant of exclu-
sive use of municipal recreational facilities to discriminatory private schools was held
to violate the fourteenth amendment. On the other hand, a grant of non-exclusive use
would not necessarily violate that amendment. Id. at 569-71 & n.10. However, the
Court did not discuss the issues of whether the schools had a constitutional right to
discriminate and to use the facilities. The Gilmore Court had approvingly noted part
of Justice Douglas' dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in
which he stated that he understood the first amendment and the related guarantees
of the Bill of Rights to create a zone of privacy which precluded government from
interfering with private clubs or groups. He further noted that government may not
tell people who their associates must be and that people may be as selective as they
wish. Id. at 179-80.
Freedom of association has traditionally been characterized as the right of an
individual to join with others to express or promote political ideas. United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigating Comm., 372 U.S.
539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1
(1964); Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and
Right to Privacy, 1970 Duin L.J. 1181, 1195, 1197 (1970).
Freedom of association seems to bear little similarity to a right to exclude others
on the basis of race; one may argue that the right to exclude impairs the associational
freedom of the person who wishes to join. Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The
Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom From Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1458
(1975).
2 515 F.2d at 1088. The court declared that prior cases dealing with the right of
privacy were inapposite because they involved instances in which only a few people
were involved in activities unintended for the public view and in which there was some
plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race. Id.
1 No case has yet extended the right of privacy beyond specific situations involv-
ing family, home, or marital relations. The right of privacy has been used to support
the right to obtain abortions, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); the right of single
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right of privacy may extend to activities relating to education. 5 This
dictum, combined with two earlier Supreme Court cases" which in-
validated state laws impairing parental ability to obtain educational
services from private schools, may be viewed as support for the idea
that parents have the right to control the education of their children.
However, these cases also recognized that state interests could out-
weigh parental interests if sufficiently compelling." Consequently, it
can be strongly argued in support of the Fourth Circuit that the
government does indeed have a sufficiently compelling interest in the
interdiction of racial discrimination, an interest which stands on the
highest constitutional ground."
One remaining question presented by the McCrary decision is how
private a group must be to escape the expanded application of § 1981.
The Fourth Circuit found no discernible non-racial rule of exclusivity
that could be used to bar the plaintiffs' admission. 9 It further noted
that the schools were private only in the sense that they were man-
aged by private individuals and received no state funds," and this
was held insufficient to exempt them from § 1981. 41 However, the
people to acquire contraceptives, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); the right
of married couples to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
and the right to possess obscene material in the home, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
34 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). In Meyer, the statute involved forbade the teaching of foreign languages
to students below the high school level. In Pierce, the state of Oregon had enacted a
law requiring all parents to enroll their children in public schools.
" Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 392 (1923).
1 See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), afl'd sub nor. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). In Green, the court denied tax exempt status for discrimi-
natory private schools, noting that government interest in the interdiction of racial
discrimination is dominant over other constitutional interests. Id. at 1167. But cf.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the Court held that the state had
failed to establish a "compelling interest" in keeping children in public school for an
additional two years beyond the sixth grade. Id. at 221.
3' 515 F.2d. at 1089.
40 Furthermore, the defendants could claim no exemption from § 1981 as a "pri-
vate establishment" under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
Section 2000a(e) provides in pertinent part: "Thelse] provisions . . . shall not apply
to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public .... Id.
11 515 F.2d at 1089. Courts have decided a number of cases dealing with the degree
of privacy of "private clubs" in determining their status under the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, and some of the same considerations may be applied to private schools. Bases for
holdings in these cases have included advertising, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 304
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
basic question for determining whether an establishment is public or
private for the purposes of federal civil rights law is whether the
establishment offers to serve the general public.2 If a school selects
its students on purely objective criteria and is not indiscriminately
open to the white public, it should be held exempt from § 1981 be-
cause it offers blacks the "same right" as whites to receive equal
consideration of their applications. In McCrary, however, the schools
were indeed indiscriminately open to the white public,43 and the court
therefore determined that § 1981 should apply.
Prior case law regarding the right of private groups to discriminate
has indicated that in the area of business and commerce the concept
of racial equality will take precedence over the concept of individual
freedom from governmental intrusion.44 Conversely, courts have con-
sidered the freedom from government intrusion to be the more impor-
tant value in the context of the home. 5 Since private schools consti-
tute a middle ground between life at home and in the business world,
the McCrary court had no clear legal basis for making its decision.
In holding that § 1981 reached blatant racial discrimination by pri-
vate parties, the Fourth Circuit further implemented the constitu-
tional protections found in the thirteenth amendment.
In a second case involving § 1981 and § 1982, Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Association,6 the Fourth Circuit was asked to de-
termine whether directors of a corporation, previously adjudged
guilty of unlawful discrimination, 7 were personally liable for dam-
ages and attorney's fees. The district court had absolved the directors
(1969); failure to reject a significant number of white applicants, Nesmith v. YMCA,
397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968); offering facilities to non-members in violation of club
bylaws, United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 92-93 (E.D. La.
1967); the lack or nominality of dues and large membership lists, Bradshaw v.
Whigham, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 934, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1966); lack of formal membership
selection procedures, Stout v. YMCA, 404 F.2d 687, 687-88 (5th Cir. 1968); and
whether members owned club facilities, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); or
had control over the operation of the establishment, Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp.
1143, 1155 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
42 See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1969); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim
Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1974).
1 515 F.2d at 1089. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236
(1969).
" See note 41 supra.
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
" Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). See note 16
supra.
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of personal liability on finding that they did not know, nor in the
exercise of due diligence could they have known, that the corpora-
tion's exclusionary policy was illegal. The primary issue raised in the
Fourth Circuit was whether such knowledge of illegality was neces-
sary for culpability in actions brought under § 1981 and § 1982.
In reversing the district court and holding the directors liable, the
Fourth Circuit analogized actions under statutes forbidding racial
discrimination to actions for redress of a tort, without explaining
exactly what or how a tort had been committed." Indeed, no mention
of tort law concepts is made in either § 198141 or § 1982.0 The Tillman
court apparently reasoned, however, that because these statutes de-
fined a legal duty not to discriminate and implicitly authorized com-
pensation for the defendants' wrongful breach of this duty,. they
sounded in tort.51 This characterization is questionable because of a
lack of directly supporting authority. 2 The only case cited by the
court for this concept, Curtis v. Loether,53 dealt with a violation of
the fair housing provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act 4 and not with
§ 1981 or § 1982. Apparently, no other court has considered an action
under these statutes as one sounding in tort, and application of the
constitutional tort theory developed under § 1983 seems inappro-
priate.55 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit's action, although creative,
" In dictum, the Supreme Court has likened actions for redress of racial discrimi-
nation to actions for defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress. The Court
determined that such actions could be considered as redress for a "dignitary tort."
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 n.10 (1974). See also Eckenrode v. Life of
America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); C. GREGORY AND H. KALVEN, CASES AND
MATERUS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 52-55 (4th
ed. 1971).
4 See note 7 supra.
0 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). For text of § 1982, see note 10 supra.
5' See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
5' The Seventh Circuit in Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), affd
sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), declared that a racial discrimination
suit could be considered analogous to the so-called "new tort" for extreme and outra-
geous conduct which results in emotional harm. This "new tort" was described in
Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972), as the intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress. The Seventh Circuit listed the elements neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case under this "new tort" concept: (1) outrageous
conduct by the defendant; (2) defendant's intention to cause, or reckless disregard of
the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or
extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional
distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Id. at 4.
5415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
-" In the past fifteen years, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) has been the basis for the
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is subject to criticism.
This criticism extends into the remainder of the decision because
the court applied the tort analogy when it examined general corpora-
tion law to determine whether the "peculiar nature" of director status
might shield the defendants from personal liability under § 1981 and
§ 1982.11 Directors not personally participating in a corporation's tor-
tious activity are normally not subject to liability by virtue of their
offices. 5 It appears, however, that a director's vote for an act is suffi-
cient for the imposition of personal liability." Thus, because the de-
fendant directors did vote for the exclusionary policy, the court con-
cluded that they could be personally liable for the effects of the tor-
tious discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit did not stop at this point, however, but went
on to characterize the directors' actions as voluntary and deliberate,"
development of a constitutional tort. Under this concept, officials acting under color
of state law to deprive people of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, particularly by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, will be
subject to civil liability. Section 1983 is to be read against a background of tort liability
which makes one responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background"of Tort
Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1966). However, the Fourth Circuit does not
appear to be referring to the constitutional tort in Tillman. Sections 1981 and 1982
have never been used as a source for this concept, perhaps because they were not
derived from the same statute as § 1983. Moreover, constitutional tort doctrine has
never been extended to conduct by private individuals not acting under color of state
law. Finally, unlike § 1983, § 1981 and § 1982 were not based on the fourteenth
amendment, which affords protection only when the constitutional deprivation is
caused by state action.
An analogy to statutory tort theory, however, may be applicable. See Carr v.
Murrows Transfer, Inc., 262 N.C. 550, 554, 138 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1964), holding that
an ordinance enacted for the protection and safety of the public creates a presumptive
right in the general public not to be harmed by a violation. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 36 (4th ed. 1971).
517 F.2d at 1144.
5 See Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958);
Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393,397 (2d Cir. 1943); Leonard v. Saint
Joseph Lead Co., 75 F.2d 390, 395 (8th Cir. 1935); Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F.
Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cott Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc.,
146 F. Supp. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1135, 1137 (Perm. ed. 1965); Fletcher v. Havre de Grace
Fireworks Co., 229 Md. 196, 177 A.2d 908, 910 (1962); cf. Aeroglide Corp. v. Zeh, 301
F.2d 420, 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
11 See Saxlehner v. Eisner, 140 F. 938 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905); National Cash-
Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502, 509 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 723 (1899).
1' 517 F.2d at 1143.
1976]
482 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
and therefore denominated the tort an intentional one. This charac-
terization of the § 1981 and § 1982 violations as intentional torts
permitted easy disposal of the directors' defenses of good faith and
good intent."' Similarly, the court held the directors' defense of due
diligence inapplicable because it was essentially based upon the con-
cept of good faith."' The directors had apparently contended that they
had acted with the requisite diligence in attempting to ascertain their
legal duty, and their ignorance of the law was the result of misinfor-
mation supplied by counsel. The application of the tort concept,
however, prevented utilization of a defense of mistake of law, 2 and
the Fourth Circuit thus held that the defendants' ignorance of the
law, despite their diligent efforts to ascertain it, was no bar to impos-
ing liability. Additionally, the court declared that the affirmative
defense of due diligence was appropriate only in negligence actions63
and not in cases in which corporate directors are charged with inten-
tionally tortious acts. The due diligence defense arose in and has been
limited to negligence actions, primarily in the field of securities law,64
and the Fourth Circuit's decision reflects an unwillingness to extend
it beyond this area.65
' 517 F.2d at 1143. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
11 The Fourth Circuit here seemed to confuse good faith or good intent with the
directors' affirmative defense of due diligence. Good faith and intent concern the
motive underlying one's actions and were totally irrelevant to the directors' defense of
due diligence, which referred to their lack of knowledge concerning the scope of the
law after reasonable efforts had been made to ascertain it. None of the cases cited as
support for the court's position, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971),
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
15 (1958), dealt with the defense of due diligence. Nor has any other case held that a
defendant in a § 1981 or § 1982 action need not know the duties the statutes imposed.
62 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF Toars § 17 (4th ed. 1971). Tortfeasors may not use
mistake as a defense. Id.
Due diligence has been applied only in cases in which directors are charged with
failure to exercise reasonable care, a negligence theory. See cases cited note 64 infra.
" Cases discussing the due diligence defense include Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d
241, 247 (2d Cir. 1956); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (1961), aff'd,
11 N.Y.2d 960, 229 N.Y.S.2d 10, 183 N.E.2d 325 (1962). For a general discussion of
the due diligence defense, see Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 1411 (1968).
65 The court attempted to distinguish the cases cited by the defendants by positing
that due diligence applied only to the directors' knowledge of the facts, rather than of
the law. However, the court had to address the holdings in Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d
241 (2d Cir. 1956), and Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430
(1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 229 N.Y.S.2d 10, 183 N.E.2d 325 (1962), which indicated
otherwise. Both Spirt and Gilbert were derivative actions in which the directors suc-
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In holding the directors individually liable, the Fourth Circuit
apparently disregarded the distinction between ignorance of the law
and the impossibility of knowing one is violating the law. 8 Ignorance
of the law implies that a legal duty has been clearly established and
that one is merely unaware of that duty, whereas it was impossible
for the directors in Tillman to ascertain their duty in light of the
absence of cases under the civil rights statutes. Holding the directors
liable in spite of their efforts to ascertain their legal duty appears to
violate all fairness considerations and amounts to an imposition of
retroactive liability. More important, however, since there was no
established duty, it was impossible for an intentionally wrongful,
tortious act to have been committed which would justify imposing
liability on the directors." The element of fault or culpability is nec-
cessfully asserted the defense that they had relied on counsel's interpretation of the
law. Both involved the directors' duty of due care to the corporation they served, and
the cases held that the due diligence defense was available to them against the charge
of their negligent breach of duty to the corporation.
The Tiliman court, therefore, distinguished them on the ground that they did not
support a holding that due diligence in seeking to ascertain the law would be a defense
to a suit brought by a third party for an intentional tort.
88 The Tiliman court in effect imposed a strict liability on directors of corporations
guilty of discriminatory conduct by holding that directors could not escape liability
regardless of their efforts to determine their legal duty. This imposition was made in
spite of the uncertainty of their actual duty under § 1981 and § 1982. At the time the
directors consulted counsel and promulgated the white-only membership policy, there
were no cases indicating the nature of their duty under § 1981 or § 1982. The directors
believed that their exclusionary policies were valid under the "private club" exemption
of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970). Not until the
Supreme Court subsequently decided Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969), could the directors have been informed that private associations such as
Wheaton-Haven might be within the scope of the civil rights statutes barring racial
discrimination. Further proof of the unclear state of the law can be found in the
unreported district court decision granting summary judgment to Wheaton-Haven and
the Fourth Circuit decision affirming the district court. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971). Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957). In Lambert, a municipal ordinance made it an offense for a person con-
victed of a felony in California to remain in the city more than five days without
registering at the police department. The Supreme Court held that if the ordinance
was applied to a person who lacked knowledge of the duty to register and no showing
was made of the probability of such knowledge, the ordinance violated fourteenth
amendment due process. Id. at 229-30.
" See Marcum v. United States, 452 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1971); Stief v. J. A. Sexauer
Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967); Whetzel v. Jess
Fisher Management Co., 108 U.S. App. D.C. 385, 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 245 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1957); Gabel v. Hughes
Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co.,
67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946). None of the cases cited in the opinion dealing with
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essary in every tort, and this in turn requires the existence of a duty
upon the tortfeasor 8 It thus appears that the Fourth Circuit's impo-
sition of liability upon the Tillman directors was erroneous.
In summary, Tillman established a duty for corporate directors to
prevent exclusionary policies based on race. Violations of this duty
will now be actionable under § 1981 and § 1982. Because the direc-
tors' duty has now been clearly established, the strict liability im-
posed by the court on the defendant directors in Tillman will no
longer present a problem. The real significance of Tillman is its un-
precedented characterization of § 1981 and § 1982 violations as torts
and its indication that the due diligence defense will be recognized
by the Fourth Circuit only in cases of corporate directors' negligence.
In the final decision involving private discrimination, Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine
whether an employee is protected by federal law from discharge be-
cause he belongs to an organtization objectionable to his private em-
ployer. The plaintiff had sued his former employer under the Civil
Rights Acts of 18710 and 196471 for reinstatement and damages, alleg-
due diligence states that the element of culpability is unnecessary in imposing liability.
Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d
430 (1961), afl'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 229 N.Y.S.2d 10, 182 N.E.2d 325 (1962). Also, Lobato
v. Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1958), noted that a positive
wrongful act was necessary to generate individual liability. Id. at 409. Implicit in this
statement is the requirement that one breach a legal duty before his act can be deemed
wrongful.
See note 67 supra.
,' 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
7' 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of per-
sons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws. . .; in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one
or more of the conspirators.
Id.
For a general discussion of recent treatment of § 1985(3), see Note, Federal Power
to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the
Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUm. L. Rv. 449, 495-500 (1974); Note,
Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power to Legislate Against Private
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ing that he was fired for belonging to the Ku Klux Klan. The district
court dismissed the complaint, declaring that the freedom of associa-
tion was protected only against interference by the state and not by
private parties.7 2 The issue on appeal was whether the right of free
association was protected against private interference as well.
In affirming dismissal of the complaint, the Fourth Circuit based
its decision solely on its interpretation of § 1985(3) .7 It appears,
however, that the majority could have affirmed without treating the
constitutional implications of this statute. Section 1985(3) requires
that there be a conspiracy,74 and there was no factual support in the
case for such a finding. The complaint alleged only that the plaintiffs
supervisor had conspired with the corporation for which they both
worked.7 5 Since the supervisor was an agent of the-corporation and
his acts were actually those of the corporation, it could be argued that
two separate legal entities did not exist, and thus there was no con-
spiracy.7B
The majority, however, began by examining the constitutional
aspects of the case. Although it conceded that state action was not
an indispensable requirement for the application of § 19 8 5 (3 ),7 the
Discriminations; The Guest Case, 52 CoRN. L.Q. 586 (1967); Comment, Constitutional
and Jurisdictional Problems in the Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 52 B.U.L. REv.
599 (1972).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-(l) to ...discharge any individual . ..because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
2 Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1973).
n The court held 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) inapplicable because it forbade dis-
crimination based only on classifications of race, color, sex, religion or national origin.
Since the plaintiff had initially characterized the Ku Klux Klan as a "patriotic organi-
zation," the Fourth Circuit refused to consider whether it qualified as a religion under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 508 F.2d at 505.
" For the text of § 1985(3), see note 70 supra.
, The district court held that the complaint alleged a multi-party conspiracy
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and addressed the merits without discuss-
ing the legal identities of the conspiring parties. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368
F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (E.D. Va. 1973).
" See Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th
Cir. 1974); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
" 508 F.2d at 506-7. Although § 1985(3) contains no express "state action" or
"under color of state law" limitation, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), the Supreme Court
had held in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), that since private individuals
could not deprive their victims of equal protection of the laws, a right secured by the
fourteenth amendment only against state infringement, § 1985(3) implicitly carried a
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majority declared the need for some degree of state involvement. The
court based this requirement on the fact that the language of §
1985(3) repeats the equal protection language of the fourteenth
amendment.7 8 The Bellamy court noted that the fourteenth amend-
ment is phrased as a prohibition against the states rather than pri-
vate parties, and reasoned that the drafters of § 1985(3) must also
have intended a similar prohibition. Further, the Fourth Circuit rec-
ognized the derivation of associational freedom from the first amend-
ment. 9 Since this amendment was intended as a prohibition only
state action requirement. Collins involved a private, non-racial conspiracy to disrupt
a political protest meeting.
7' 508 F.2d at 50.6-07. See U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
7' The court noted that the Ku Klux Klan is essentially a political organization.
Although freedom of political association has been recognized as a basic right under
the first amendment, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), it has never been
considered independent of that amendment. Thus, it has always been applied only
against state interference through the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
Had the plaintiff in Bellamy been discharged for a religious affiliation, the result
may have been different. The Fourth Circuit may have been more inclined to follow
the holding in Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971), in which an en banc
court declared that § 1985(3) reached purely private action interfering with a person's
first amendment rights of freedom of assembly and worship. The Eighth Circuit held
that Congress had the power to reach conspiracies under § 1 and § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment and that first amendment rights were incorporated to apply against the
states. Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), had held that private conspir-
acies, without state action, were within the scope of § 1985(3), see text accompanying
notes 85-87 infra, the Action court determined that the first amendment rights of
freedom of association and worship were protected against a wholly private action. The
concurring opinion in Action found that in disrupting the church services, there was
racial, invidious discriminatory animus sufficient to bring the conspirators' actions
within the scope of § 1985(3). It is likely that the Fourth Circuit would have no trouble
in determining that a religious class possessed a sufficiently "discrete, insular and
immutable" character to warrant application of § 1985(3). See Bellamy v. Mason's
Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1973).
Another case applying § 1985(3) to a wholly private conspiracy was Richardson v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971). In Richardson, the defendants allegedly discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff by discharging him from his employment because he ex-
pressed views criticizing their racially discriminatory employment practices and be-
cause he advocated racial equality in employment opportunities. The Third Circuit
held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to constitute the racial or otherwise
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus required by Griffin.
Conversely, other courts dealing with non-racial conspiracies have steadfastly held
that state involvement must be alleged. See Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 195
(7th Cir. 1972); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 464 (S.D. Tex. 1972), af'd, 479 F.2d
1044 (5th Cir. 1973). Other courts have avoided the issue. See Arnold v. Tiffany, 487
F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974) (absence of a class-based
animus); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
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against the federal government, the court was unwilling to extend its
doctrine to conduct by private individuals."
The Bellamy court primarily relied upon United States v. Guest8
to support its reasoning. In Guest, the Supreme Court noted that if
the language of a statute simply followed that of the fourteenth
amendment and no other source of the right to be vindicated existed,
state action would be required. The Court stated that there were no
equal protection clause rights against totally private action. 2 Regard-
less of its apparent applicability, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on
Guest does not appear to be well-founded. First, the Supreme Court
made no mention of § 1985(3) in Guest. Second, Guest involved a
criminal rather than a civil conspiracy by private individuals which
violated 18 U.S.C. § 241.83 The language of the two statutes is similar,
but the Supreme Court gave no indication that its reading of a crimi-
nal statute should be extended by analogy to one providing only for
civil actions."
The Fourth Circuit gave scant attention to Griffin v.
Breckenridge, a subsequent Supreme Court decision dealing directly
with § 1985(3) and extensively discussed by the district court. In
Griffin, a unanimous Court removed the state action limitation from
§ 1985(3), finding nothing inherent in the phrase "equal protection
of the laws" that required the deprivational action to originate with
the state.8 The Court held that the phrase was not tied to the state
action aspect of the fourteenth amendment, and reasoned that con-
930 (1973) (absence of a class); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 10-11 (4th
Cir. 1972) (absence of a class).
508 F.2d at 507.
NI 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The Supreme Court held that a wholly private conspiracy
to deny black citizens the right of travel was within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
A 383 U.S. at 754.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same;...
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
Id.
84 It would seem unwise to apply interpretations of criminal statutes to civil ones
because of the vastly different consequences involved for violations of each. It might
also be noted that criminal and civil statutes almost invariably have different statutory
origins, reflecting different legislative intent. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1975).
- 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Griffin involved a private conspiracy to assault a group of
black civil rights workers while they were travelling on interstate roads in Mississippi.
Id. at 97.
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gressional failure to write any state action requirement into § 1985(3)
revealed an intent to reach all deprivations of equal protection of the
laws. 7
Rather than ignore Griffin and base its holding on an inapposite
case, the Fourth Circuit might have applied the Griffin principles to
reach the same result. A necessary element for culpability under §
1985(3) is intent to deprive another of equal protection of or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. Griffin construed this re-
quirement as a mandate for some invidiously discriminatory racial or
class-based animus behind the conspirator's action." No racial ani-
mus was involved in Bellamy; nor was there a motive based on mem-
bership in a class defined by any traditional indicia of suspectness,
such as classes of race, national origin and sex.89 Thus, it would seem
that § 1985(3) provided no cause of action for the plaintiff in Bellamy.
The Bellamy decision indicates that the Fourth Circuit is unwill-
ing to extend the scope of § 1985(3) to protect the right of free associa-
tion against wholly private action unless the plaintiff is a victim of
invidious discrimination against the class to which he belongs. Al-
though the term "discrete class" has never been precisely defined,
such classes may include categories of race, color, sex, national origin
or religion." Outside of these areas, however, the Fourth Circuit will
probably require some element of state action.2
By its decisions in the field of private discrimination, the Fourth
Circuit has shown a willingness to extend the reach of federal law to
include racially discriminatory conduct by private parties. The court
in McCrary suggested that it will no longer allow race discrimination
in admission policies of private schools where there are no objective
factors being considered. Nor will the rights of free association and
privacy serve as a shield for such conduct. In Tillman, the court
indicated that violations of § § 1981 and 1982 will be characterized as
torts. Moreover, corporate directors committing such torts will not be
allowed to escape liability by employing the due diligence defense
that they unsuccessfully sought to learn their legal duties. Finally,
' Id. at 101.
Id. at 102. See note 79 supra.
89 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See 508 F.2d at 505.
" Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1973).
, For a discussion of various concepts of state action, see Note, State Action:
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 656 (1974).
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the Fourth Circuit's ruling in the Bellamy case demonstrated that the
right of free association is not protected against private interference
under § 1985(3) without a showing that the victim has been damaged
by a conspiracy against a discrete racial, ethnic, religious or sex-
based class to which he belonged. Furthermore, freedom of political
association now appears to be applicable only in cases involving ac-
tion by state officials.
B. Discrimination by Public Officials
The Fourth Circuit has also decided several cases involving al-
leged discrimination by public officials. Among the issues addressed
were: the burden of proof in public school desegregation cases and the
effect of demographic changes in determining where the burden lay;"
the impact of busing on black students in achieving desegregation in
a public school system; 4 and finally, the effect of an at-large election
system on the voting power of black and low-income citizens. 5
In Morton v. Charles County Board of Education," the Fourth
Circuit was asked to determine whether a board of education should
bear the burden of justifying its conduct upon proof of a reduction in
the number of black teachers and principals in its school system.
Several black educators brought the action alleging that they had
been denied employment or promotion, or had been demoted or re-
leased for racial reasons. Appealing the district court dismissal,98 the
plaintiffs argued that the lower court had not given proper presump-
tive weight to the statistical evidence of racial discrimination in the
school board's employment practices, which indicated that the per-
centage of black teachers and principals in the school system had
11 Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1975). See text
accompanying notes 96-122 infra.
'1 Wheeler v. Durham County Bd. of Educ., 521 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975). See text
accompanying notes 123-142 infra.
" Vollin v. Kimbel, 519 F.2d 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S.
November 4, 1975) (No. 75-5304). See text accompanying notes 143-155 infra.
" 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1975).
" The second class of plaintiffs were children who sued as representatives of all
black students in the school system alleging deprivation of their civil rights because
the defendants had maintained racially identifiable faculties. 520 F.2d at 872.
" Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394 (D. Md. 1974). The
district court found that the school system maintained a proper faculty ratio in twenty-
one of its twenty-six schools and that only one school had a substantial deviation from
this ratio. See Nesbit v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1969).
The district court dismissed the claims of all but one of the adult plaintiffs. 373 F.
Supp. at 410.
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dropped significantly from 1966-67 to 1969-70.11 The Fourth Circuit
had to determine the applicability of the principle set forth in Keyes
v. School District No. 1,100 which held that the sudden dispropor-
tionate decimation in the ranks of black teachers in school systems
with a long history of racial discrimination raised an inference of
discrimination which forced the school board to justify its conduct.'
In affirming the district court,"0 ' the Fourth Circuit held the Keyes
principle inapplicable and concluded that the drop in the percen-
tages ' 3 was a result of demographic changes in the county 4 rather
than discriminatory conduct by the school board. The Fourth Circuit
further held that no constitutional principle required the permanent
maintenance of racial ratios in line with the changing makeup of an
area's population. 15
In refusing to shift the burden of justifying its conduct to the
school board, the majority seemingly gave inadequate attention to
The percentage drop of black teachers and principals was from 44.2% and 37.5%
to 30.4% and 30.7%, respectively. 520 F.2d at 873.
1- 413 U.S. 189 (1973). For a general discussion of the impact of Keyes, see Com-
ment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 124 (1974).
- Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973). Accord, Chambers v.
Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
0I The district court found that one plaintiff was denied promotion to a principal's
position because of her race and awarded her the difference in salary as compensation.
The court held that she was at least as qualified for the position of principal as the
white -applicants. Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 402 (D.
Md. 1974).
'103 During the period 1960-70, the number of black principals increased from six
to eight and in 1973 stood at 30.7% of the total number of principals, while the number
of black vice-principals rose from four to six and reached about 45%. The number of
black administrators in the school system's central office increased from four to ten
and constituted 22% of that job class. The number of black teachers rose from 198 to
207, although the percentage dropped to 27%. 520 F.2d at 874.
0I Between 1960 and 1970, the population of Charles County jumped from 32,500
to 47,700, an increase of 46.4%. During the same period, the number of students in
public schools increased from 7,400 to 13,000, and by 1973, to 16,300. This reflected
the gradual outward expansion of the Washington, D.C., suburban area. The black
population had increased from 1960-70 in absolute numbers, but the percentage of
population that was black had decreased from 34% in 1960 to 29% in 1970. The percen-
tage of blacks in the school enrollment had declined from 45.7% in 1960 to 39.9% in
1970, and by 1973 to only 34%. Id.
" See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court recognized the demographic instability of modem communities
and held that yearly adjustments of racial composition were unnecessary once total
integration was achieved and racial discrimination through official action eliminated.
Id. at 31-32.
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the test outlined by the Supreme Court in Keyes. The first element
of Keyes, that the school system have a history of segregation,'
appears to have been virtually ignored by the Fourth Circuit. The
court noted only that the school board had taken affirmative steps
to desegregate its schools and that complete desegregation had been
voluntarily effected by 1967.107 The court thus implied that the good
faith efforts of the school board would render the Keyes test inapplic-
able. However, Keyes does not indicate that good faith was material
to the application of its test. The Fourth Circuit also de-emphasized
the significance of a state board of education committee report docu-
menting chronic racial discrimination within the school system. The
court stated that the committee's proceedings were not conducted in
an adversary manner and that the committee had not applied consti-
tutional or statutory principles in making its findings.' Neverthe-
less, the report constituted some evidence of a history of desegrega-
tion in the system. Moreover, in light of the district court's findings
indicating the existence of segregation until 1968,"'1 it appears that
the first element of Keyes was indeed met.
The second element of the Keyes test, that there be a discharge
of a disproportionately large number of black teachers incident to
desegregation," 0 may also have been met. The majority in Morton
held that this element was not satisfied, stating that there was no
claim or evidence that any teacher or principal was discharged be-
cause of his or her race."' However, as the dissent noted,"2 the school
board had treated a number of black personnel unfairly by its failure
to hire and promote them. Although no court has yet so held,"' it
seems that there is no difference between discharging black faculty
and refusing to hire or promote them because the effect on the ratio
of black to white faculty is the same. The elements constituting a
"disproportionate" effect on this ratio represent another unsettled
"I Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973).
' 520 F.2d at 873.
,o' Id. at 875.
,01 Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 396-97 (D. Md.
1974).
" Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973).
"' 520 F.2d at 873.
2 Id. at 876. (Butzner, J., dissenting).
.1 The closest support for this point may be found in Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that in determining
whether a school board has acted lawfully, courts should focus on the effect of a school
board's conduct rather than its purpose or motivation. Id. at 462. Thus, if a court finds
that the ranks of black faculty have been disproportionately thinned, the fact that this
was effected by conduct other than outright discharge would seem irrelevant.
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issue, but courts may arguably determine such effect primarily by
reference to percentage figures."' Applying this rationale to Morton,
it seems reasonable to conclude that there was a disproportionate
effect on the number of black teachers incident to desegregation. The
post-segregation ratio of black to white principals had changed con-
siderably from 50:50 to 30:70, and the percentage of black teachers
had dropped from 44.2% before integration to 27.4% afterwards." 5
Thus, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's holding, it appears that the
facts in Morton satisfied both elements of the Keyes test. Accord-
ingly, the court should have placed the burden of proving that its
conduct was not racially motivated upon the school board.
Even if such a burden had been placed upon the board, however,
the result in Morton may have been the same. An element more
directly related to the changing ratio of black to white faculty was the
changing makeup of the county's population."' Since the school
board showed that the percentage changes were only a reflection of
demographic change, the district court apparently did not make a
clearly erroneous ruling based on the facts in the record."' The Fourth
Circuit has defined the burden of justification on the board as one to
adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent
was not among the factors that motivated its actions."' Furnishing
proof of considerable demographic change appears to have fulfilled
this obligation. Thus, the Fourth Circuit may have determined that
the defendant school board had satisfied the burden of proof and may
not have fully discussed the Keyes test because of this.
Implicit in the Morton decision is the idea that the ratio of black
to white faculty need not be greater than the ratio of black to white
students. Although the dissent noted that the Fourth Circuit had
never subscribed to the theory that the racial composition of faculties
should mirror that of the student bodies, the majority indicated that
demographic changes should be part of the overall consideration
given to a board's conduct."' If the board's conduct lacked any delib-
"' See Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 520 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir. 1975).
Cf. Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975) (proof of actual
discrimination held not required in suit alleging discriminatory employment practices
if statistical data implies discrimination).
115 520 F.2d at 877. (Butzner, J., dissenting).
" The court attributed the change in makeup of the population to the outward
expansion of the predominantly white Washington, D.C., suburbs. 520 F.2d at 874.
,, See note 104 supra.
See Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919, 924 (4th Cir. 1974).
' See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the Supreme
Court stated that there is no universal answer to the complex problems of desegrega-
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erate attempt to fix or alter racial composition in the schools, the
courts should not make annual adjustments in such racial composi-
tion once desegregation has been accomplished. 2 ' By considering
changes in the absolute numbers of faculty, the Fourth Circuit also
appeared to recognize the danger of heavy reliance on changes in
percentages. Large percentage changes may distort the fact that the
actual change in numbers of teachers is very small, especially if the
total number of faculty in a school is low.
By emphasizing the concept of changing demographic patterns in
its decision,' the Fourth Circuit recognized a significant factor
among the items to be considered in determining where the burden
of proof should lie in public school discrimination cases. If it can be
shown that the racial makeup of a community's population has been
substantially changed, the Morton court indicated that it may not
require a school board to justify its action or inaction regarding the
hiring and promotion of black faculty with any additional evidence.
Of course, specific discriminatory intent, where present, 22 will still
override demographic considerations.
In Wheeler v. Durham County Board of Education,1" the Fourth
Circuit also dealt with the significance of demographic changes and
the degree of disproportion in the black-white ratio. The plaintiffs
tion. The matter would have to be assessed in light of the circumstances present. Id.
at 439. It would seem that demographic changes are one of those circumstances.
' Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971). An-
other factor in the court's decision may have been what the dissent termed the lack of
clear procedures for promotion, 520 F.2d at 877. This may have led to the Morton
court's conclusion that no deliberate attempt to change the racial composition had
been made by the board. Nor was the board's failure actively to recruit more black
teachers deemed by the court to be such a deliberate attempt. Seemingly, the Fourth
Circuit would require some positive act rather than a failure to act to constitute a
deliberate attempt.
The consideration of demographic changes is compatible with the statement of the
Supreme Court in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), that in
deciding whether a board has acted within the law, the court must focus on the effect
of a school board's action rather than the motivation. Id. at 462. The effect is to be
measured in light of the circumstances present in a community, and one major circum-
stance is the racial makeup of a community's population.
,2M The Fourth Circuit reached substantially the same result in Allen v. Asheville
City Bd. of Educ., 434 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1970). In Allen, the court held that where
a pattern of pupil assignment was effected by free school bus transportation, the school
board's plan requiring black children in grades 1-5 to travel as much as five or six miles
to attend previously all-white schools did not unfairly allocate the burden of integra-
tion.
,22 See Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 520 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir. 1975).
' 521 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975).
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had alleged that segregation existed in the Durham, North Carolina,
city and county school systems and requested a merger of the two
systems to achieve the requisite unitary state.' 4 The plaintiffs alter-
natively requested a redraft of boundaries whereby those of the city
district would be coterminous with the city limits. The appeal was
based on the denial of these requests by the district court,'2 5 and the
Fourth Circuit was first asked to decide whether the lower court
should have rejected that part of the county plan converting two
predominantly black schools to single-grade centers' as an unfair
burden on black students. The second issue was whether the district
court erred in ruling that implementation of the 1970 plan for the city
had resulted in a unitary,'2 completely desegregated system.
In considering the first issue, the Fourth Circuit found that the
conversion of the mainly black schools to single-grade centers was the
most feasible plan available to achieve a unitary system.'28 Although
the impact of busing fell primarily upon those in the predominantly
black schools,1 21 the facts supported a finding that the black-white
ratio thereby created was preferable to that achieved by any other
proposal.'30 The Fourth Circuit accordingly found no abuse of discre-
tion by the district court in its selection of the county plan.'3'
However, the Fourth Circuit in Wheeler rejected the finding that
the city system had become unitary. In 1970-71, almost half'3 2 of the
"I A unitary system has been held to exist if no person is excluded from any school
on the basis of race, Nesbit v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th
Cir. 169); if all vestiges of state-imposed segregation have been effectively eliminated
by official action, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971);
or if the system may be characterized as non-racial, Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
'12 Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 1352 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
,"I The single-grade centers were to be established for all blacks and whites within
expanded geographic areas. The adopted plan provided for such centers at the
kindergarten and sixth-grade levels. As a result black students had to be bused to white
areas for grades 1-5, whereas white students had to be bused to black areas only for
the kindergarten and sixth-grade years. 521 F.2d at 1138-39.
' See note 124 supra.
'2 Another plan was submitted by the county's consultant which proposed the
establishment of two three-school clusters. This was found to achieve a less desirable
racial mix than the adopted plan, which established one six-school cluster. The court
also noted that the schools in the predominantly black areas were too small to serve
as centers for grades 1-5. 521 F.2d at 1139.
'2' See note 126 supra.
' 521 F.2d at 1139.
,3, There was no evidence contradicting the superintendent's testimony that the
county plan achieved the most desirable racial mix. See note 128 supra.
,32 There were approximately 3,300 students, or 40% of the total black student
enrollment, in schools in which they comprised huge majorities. 521 F.2d at 1139.
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8,200 black students enrolled attended schools in which they consti-
tuted vast majorities.11 The court found that these conditions still
existed in 1974-75.131 On the basis of this evidence, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that it was unacceptable for 38% of the black student
population to attend schools in which they were overwhelming major-
ities, in a system where the black student enrollment was no more
than 70%.135
Had the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion
that the city system was unitary, the action would have required
dismissal under the principle established in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,3 ' that once desegregation has been
accomplished, courts need not make yearly adjustments in the racial
composition of student bodies.' 37 But in Wheeler, unlike Morton,
1 3
1
the Fourth Circuit held that the racial disparities could not be ex-
cused or explained by demographic changes. Instead, the court found
that the substantial racial disparities had always existed and that a
unitary school system had never been achieved.
This determination is questionable based on the findings of the
lower court. 39 The racial disparities found in the 1974-75 school year
may have been caused by demographic changes. However, the key to
' These maj6rities ranged from 80% to 97%. Id.
IU In 1973-74, about 38% of the total black students enrolled attended schools
where they were in majorities of 89% to 98%. In 1974-75, some 38% of the total black
student population were in schools in which they constituted majorities exceeding 90%.
Id. at 1140.
'3 See Medley v. School Bd., 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1172 (1974), in which a plan heavily relying on geographic zoning was deemed unac-
ceptable. Under the plan proposed in Medley, 42% of the system's black elementary
school children were to be enrolled in two schools in which they constituted majorities
of 89% and 91%. Id. at 1063.
136 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
131 Id. at 31-32.
11 See text accompanying notes 116-118 supra.
131 The district court had noted that both the city and county school systems had
undergone substantial changes in size and makeup of their student enrollment since
the implementation of the 1970 plan. In the city system, student enrollment dropped
from 13,093 in the 1970-71 school year to 10,696 in 1973-74, and the racial composition
of the student body changed from 63% black and 37% white in 1970 to 71% black and
29% white in 1974. In the county system the enrollment increased from 13,593 in 1970-
71 to 15,633 in 1973-74, and the racial composition of the student body rose from 19.8%
black in 1970-71 to 25% in 1973-74. Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp.
1352, 1360 (M.D.N.C. 1974). The district court attributed these changes to demo-
graphic variations. Whites were moving out of the city into the county, yet even more
blacks were moving to the county as a result of the construction of low-income housing
projects in the county. The trend for blacks in upper social and economic levels to
migrate to suburban and rural areas was also noted. Id. at 1361.
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the decision was whether the school system had ever become unitary;
in other words, whether the racial disparity in the system had origi-
nally been fostered by official conduct and later corrected. Had the
system never attained unitary status, the fact that the racial dispar-
ity might have been perpetuated by demographic changes was irrele-
vant; the courts could still effect changes in the racial makeup of the
student body at each school. Conversely, if the system had at some
point become unitary, the Swann principle'4 would apply and se-
verely discourage such court supervision. Without citing any statis-
tics, the Fourth Circuit held that the racial disparity in the Durham
school systems reflected state-imposed segregation prior to the 1970
student assignments. Because no unitary status had ever been
achieved, the court remanded for implementation of a plan designed
to eliminate one race schools.' The plan was to be adopted after
consideration of all the desegregation techniques cited in Swann,
including the pairing or grouping of schools, non-contiguous atten-
dance zones, restructuring of grade levels and busing.
4 2
In Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit has further explained the treat-
ment to be accorded evidence of demographic change in school deseg-
regation cases. If a system has become unitary, the evidence may be
given substantial weight in determining whether racial disparities
have resulted from official conduct and in considering whether the
court should intervene to alter the racial composition of the system's
schools. On the other hand, if a system has never become unitary,
such evidence is virtually useless in preventing judicial alteration of
the racial makeup of a school's enrollment.
The final case involving alleged racial discrimination by public
officials was Vollin v. Kimbel.4 3 In Vollin, the Fourth Circuit was
asked to determine whether blacks were disenfranchised by the oper-
ation of an at-large election system by which the five-member govern-
ing board of Arlington County, Virginia, was chosen.' The plaintiffs
asserted that the area of the county in which they lived was socio-
140 See text accompanying notes 136-137 supra.
"I See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971); Adams v. School
Dist. No. 5, 444 F.2d 99, 101 (4th Cir. 1971).
12 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1971).
"3 519 F.2d 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. November 4, 1975)
(No. 75-5304).
'" Under the at-large system, the entire electorate of the county chose each mem-
ber of the county's governing board, and more than one member could come from the
same electoral district. This system had been adopted in 1930, replacing a system in
which the voters within each electoral district chose one representative to the board
from the district in which the voters resided. Id.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
economically distinct from the rest of the county because the vast
majority of the county's black and low-income citizens resided there.
Consequently, they alleged that the at-large voting system unconsti-
tutionally diluted the voting power of that area. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court dismissal, finding that the at-large system
presented no formal barriers to participation in county elections and
that it had no actual impact on the plaintiffs' voting power."' At-
large election systems, which do not require board members to be
elected from different electoral districts, were held not to be per se
unconstitutional. ' Furthermore, blacks were found unentitled to
seat a representative on the county board when they comprised less
than 6% of the electorate.
The court based its constitutional holding in part on two Supreme
Court cases, Dusch v. Davis'47 and Dallas County v. Reese."' In
Dusch, the election plan for an eleven-member city council provided
that each member be chosen on an at-large basis. Four members were
to be chosen without regard to residence, but the remaining seven
were required to reside in different election districts.' In upholding
the electoral system, the Court determined that the use of districts
as a basis of residence did not mean that the candidates would repre-
sent only the district in which each lived. Absent any proof to the
contrary, courts were to assume that each councilman represented
the city as a whole. The assumption appears to be valid, since the
tenure of each councilman depended upon the electorate of the entire
city. Theoretically, each councilman, as an elected representative,
would be responsive to the interests of all those in the electing body.50
A similar at-large election plan, under which each of the four commis-
sioners was required to reside in a different electoral district, was
challenged in Dallas County. As in Dusch, the population within each
l Id.
"' The case does not mention which constitutional principles were to be applied
in the court's decision. However, based on the cases cited in the opinion, it appears
that the plaintiffs were alleging that invidious discrimination had resulted from the
election system because their votes were weighted differently according to where they
lived. This was held to be an unconstitutional violation of the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-68 (1964).
"7 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
"A 421 U.S. 477 (1975).
. In Dusch, the population of the seven districts varied greatly. Assuming the
percentage of qualified voters in each district was proportional to its population, the
two largest districts could select all eleven councilmen in an at-large election if they
united their efforts. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 117 n.5 (1967).
"' See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 , 438 (1965).
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electoral district varied widely.' The Dallas Court rejected the pre-
sumption that elected officials would represent only the districts in
which they resided rather than the entire electorate which chose
them.
In Vollin, the Fourth Circuit addressed a similar presumption
based on race rather than residence. The plaintiffs asserted that
white elected officials would represent only those of their race rather
than the electorate as a whole. However, there was no proof in the
case of any discriminatory purpose in the alteration of the method for
elections, and thus black voters were not entitled to insist that their
strength as a voting bloc be preserved. Even assuming that the group
living in the allegedly unrepresented area was a racially or economi-
cally identifiable element of the population of the county, the lack
of proof of a dilution in voting strength compelled dismissal of the
suit. 152
The court in Vollin relied on a Supreme Court case, City of Rich-
mond v. United States,'53 in discussing the racial presumption. City
of Richmond established the principle that an election system should
fairly reflect the voting strength of blacks. Since in Vollin the popula-
tion of Arlington County was at most 6% black, the Supreme Court
requirement was obviously satisfied by the at-large system. Because
the great majority of the population was white, no five-man board
could reasonably be required to seat a black. Had the population
been at least 20% black, an intermediate situation between the two
cases, justification of an all-white board would have been more diffi-
cult. However, absent any evidence indicating otherwise, the princi-
ple that each member is responsive to the entire electorate would
probably be applied to reach the same result.'54
15 One district contained about half of the county's population, but could only
elect one resident to the four-man board. Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 477-
78 (1975).
152 519 F.2d at 791.
153 95 S. Ct. 2296 (1975). In City of Richmond, a municipality annexed an area
with a white majority and thereby reduced the black population from 52% to 42% of
the total. An at-large election system for the nine city council positions was also
continued. The Supreme Court held that the potential enhancement of the white
majority's power totally to exclude blacks from the city council should be prevented
by replacing the at-large system with a ward system. The latter system was considered
more effective in affording blacks representation reasonably equivalent to their politi-
cal strength in the enlarged community. In City of Richmond, the at-large system was
in fact replaced by a nine-ward system of choosing council members. Four wards had
black majorities of at least 64%, four had heavily white majorities, and the ninth had
a black-white ratio of 41:59. Id. at 2301.
"I See Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 115 (1967); Vollin v. Kimbel, 519 F.2d 790,
